ferring their stocks to a world buffer pool. In addition, there were significant finan-
cial and management problems to overcome, problems of individual commodity
bargaining, and lack of guarantees for securing stability in terms of real purchasing
power and not merely in monetary terms.
institutional changes that would be involved in adopting even the more modest
versions of arrangements for reducing excessive price fluctuation, `their adoption
cannot at this stage be regarded as being within the realms of practical politics'. Six
points were made for improving the technical, economic and political conditions
for concluding international buffer stock arrangements:
stabilization measures, adoption of liberal national stockholding policies and
acceptance of a code of international behaviour;
insurance was sought on the international plane;
many problems; and
ution was to `promote the rational disposal of intermittent agricultural surpluses'.
The FAO secretariat had been forced to address the issue of the disposal of agri-
cultural surpluses with the growth of large food stocks, particularly in the United
States, and pressures to release them (FAO, 1964). Wheat stocks in the four major
exporting countries (United States, Canada, Argentina and Australia) had reached
over 34 million metric tons by 1955 and were to grow to over 58 million tons in
1961. Stocks of coarse grains (barley, oats, maize, sorghum and rye) in the United
States and Canada alone were 32 million metric tons in 1955 and increased to
almost 82 million metric tons in 1961. In addition, there were accumulating stocks
of rice, dairy products, vegetable oils and oil seeds, cotton and coffee.
