World Food Conference 1974

MAC/WFY

Page-138

0230_553559_15_cha11

138

197090. The World Food Crisis of the 1970s and its Aftermath

would flounder for lack of financial resources. President Gerald Ford in his address
to the UN General Assembly linked food to what he called the oil-producing
nations' responsibility to formulate a `global strategy for food and energy'.

There was mounting consensus against creating another piece of bureaucratic

UN machinery. It was predictable that the most energetic criticism of the proposed
World Food Authority came from the FAO secretariat. This was seen as a threat to
FAO's mandate and rival in its own realm of competence. They vigorously lobbied
against the proposal and proposed instead that FAO itself should undertake the
primary responsibility for follow-up procedures after the conference. They failed to
appreciate that the mood in the conference was that there was need for a political
committee of ministers when it came to making policy and to get things done
rather than relying on the traditional UN bodies that had failed to produce results.
Therefore, in place of the proposal before the conference, various alternatives were
suggested, including a World Food Council (WFC) with the same membership as
the UN Security Council. The objective behind this proposal was to obtain from
governments the same degree of political commitment to solving the problems of
food and hunger as they gave to the issue of war. Under this plan, the proposed
council would be answerable to the UN General Assembly on political issues and
to an upgraded FAO Council on technical matters. It would have two committees,
one on aid and another on food security. It was appreciated that any new body
would have to take account of feelings in the G77 (the group of non-aligned
countries) that the UN specialized agencies, including FAO, had inclined to a
western view of development due to the heavy weighting of staff in favour of the
major contributing donors.

But there was disunity among G77 member delegations. A row broke out over

the Algerian draft resolution that the proposed council should be appointed by
the UN General Assembly to give it more teeth. Other G77 members wanted an
upgraded version of the FAO Council. Eventually, the G77 united behind a formula
making the proposed council directly responsible to the UN Security Council. The
developed country group wanted the proposed council members to be elected by
ECOSOC. The Soviet Union put forward a compromise calling on the UN General
Assembly `to consider setting up a world food policy coordinating body

under

the guidance of ECOSOC'. The location of the proposed council was also seen to
depend on which existing UN body it would be most closely linked.

The G77 also drew up plans for a radical alteration of the world trading system.

Its draft resolution called for: a completely new deal for developing countries
on world markets; food at reasonable prices; reduction of food consumption in
the rich states; an end to restrictive practices in the from policies of developed
countries; preference to Third World country exports, even if they competed with
domestically produced products; and postponement of debt repayments.

At the end of the conference, Sayed Marei made an `objective and dispassionate

assessment' of the outcome of its work. In his view, its first accomplishment was
the widespread interest and concern that the conference had generated regarding
the problems of hunger and malnutrition. Participants had recognized that all
lived in an interdependent world and that no country could live in isolation.

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Useful links	World Food Conference 1974 MAC/WFY Page-138 0230_553559_15_cha11 138 197090. The World Food Crisis of the 1970s and its Aftermath would flounder for lack of financial resources. President Gerald Ford in his address to the UN General Assembly linked food to what he called the oil-producing nations' responsibility to formulate a `global strategy for food and energy'. There was mounting consensus against creating another piece of bureaucratic UN machinery. It was predictable that the most energetic criticism of the proposed World Food Authority came from the FAO secretariat. This was seen as a threat to FAO's mandate and rival in its own realm of competence. They vigorously lobbied against the proposal and proposed instead that FAO itself should undertake the primary responsibility for follow-up procedures after the conference. They failed to appreciate that the mood in the conference was that there was need for a political committee of ministers when it came to making policy and to get things done rather than relying on the traditional UN bodies that had failed to produce results. Therefore, in place of the proposal before the conference, various alternatives were suggested, including a World Food Council (WFC) with the same membership as the UN Security Council. The objective behind this proposal was to obtain from governments the same degree of political commitment to solving the problems of food and hunger as they gave to the issue of war. Under this plan, the proposed council would be answerable to the UN General Assembly on political issues and to an upgraded FAO Council on technical matters. It would have two committees, one on aid and another on food security. It was appreciated that any new body would have to take account of feelings in the G77 (the group of non-aligned countries) that the UN specialized agencies, including FAO, had inclined to a western view of development due to the heavy weighting of staff in favour of the major contributing donors. But there was disunity among G77 member delegations. A row broke out over the Algerian draft resolution that the proposed council should be appointed by the UN General Assembly to give it more teeth. Other G77 members wanted an upgraded version of the FAO Council. Eventually, the G77 united behind a formula making the proposed council directly responsible to the UN Security Council. The developed country group wanted the proposed council members to be elected by ECOSOC. The Soviet Union put forward a compromise calling on the UN General Assembly `to consider setting up a world food policy coordinating body under the guidance of ECOSOC'. The location of the proposed council was also seen to depend on which existing UN body it would be most closely linked. The G77 also drew up plans for a radical alteration of the world trading system. Its draft resolution called for: a completely new deal for developing countries on world markets; food at reasonable prices; reduction of food consumption in the rich states; an end to restrictive practices in the from policies of developed countries; preference to Third World country exports, even if they competed with domestically produced products; and postponement of debt repayments. At the end of the conference, Sayed Marei made an `objective and dispassionate assessment' of the outcome of its work. In his view, its first accomplishment was the widespread interest and concern that the conference had generated regarding the problems of hunger and malnutrition. Participants had recognized that all lived in an interdependent world and that no country could live in isolation. back to top Next page
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