that they would be acceptable to all concerned in Washington, DC, bearing in
mind past hostility to the United Nations and multilateral assistance in the Depart-
ments of Agriculture and State, and in the White House itself.
of the large food surpluses that had accumulated in government-held stocks. No
formal commitment was made of supplementary cash resources: that possibility
would be `explored' in Washington. The size of the total proposed resources ($100
million over three years) was calculated to be large enough to be meaningful to
other delegations, but not too large to create opposition in Washington. And they
were to be `a supplement to bilateral arrangements', not a substitute for them. The
project, not programme, approach proposed was to avoid the criticism that had
already been made of the effects of US bulk programme food aid on international
trade and domestic food production in recipient countries that had led the FAO
to recommend its Principles of Surplus Disposal. It also facilitated evaluation of the
impact of food aid on individual development projects and specific groups of poor
and hungry people.
ment.) It was to be `a truly multilateral program with the widest possible contri-
butions by member countries'. This served notice that the United States was not
prepared to address the food problem of developing countries alone. International
burden-sharing was needed to tackle their dimensions, politically and financially.
This would help both to meet the costs involved and give an opportunity to
all donors to contribute according to their comparative advantage in terms of
food commodities (and the kinds of food needed), money for transportation and
administration, and services, such as shipping.
and its early work on world food security and food surplus concerns and issues. It
also reflected confidence in the ability of FAO's director-general, B. R. Sen, to run
the proposed programme effectively. McGovern had met with Sen in Washington,
DC in February 1961. Both respected each other. McGovern wrote to President
Kennedy, `I think it is very important that assurance be given to Dr. Sen that the
US Food for Peace Program will explore various possibilities of multilateral distri-
bution of agricultural abundance', the first hint that he was already contemplating
the ideas that were later to emerge in the personal initiative he took at the FAO
Intergovernmental Advisory Committee meeting in Rome in April 1961.
on his study concerning a multilateral food aid facility. In his autobiography he
wrote
for Peace Programme in the White House, finally got my proposal off the